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Abstract This article provides a conceptual and norma-
tive framework through which we may understand the
potentially ethically significant roles that information
generated by neurotechnologies about our brains and
minds may play in our construction of our identities.
Neuroethics debates currently focus disproportionately
on the ways that third parties may (ab)use these kinds
of information. These debates occlude interests we may
have in whether and how we ourselves encounter infor-
mation about our own brains and minds. This gap is not
yet adequately addressed by most allusions in the litera-
ture to potential identity impacts. These lack the requisite
conceptual or normative foundations to explain why we
should be concerned about such effects or how they
might be addressed. This article seeks to fill this gap by
presenting a normative account of identity as constituted
by embodied self-narratives. It proposes that information
generated by neurotechnologies can play significant
content-supplying and interpretive roles in our construc-
tion of our self-narratives. It argues, to the extent that
these roles support and detract from the coherence and
inhabitability of these narratives, access to information
about our brains and minds engages non-trivial identity-
related interests. These claims are illustrated using exam-
ples drawn from empirical literature reporting reactions to
information generated by implantable predictive BCIs
and psychiatric neuroimaging. The article concludes by
highlighting ways in which information generated by
neurotechnologies might be governed so as to protect
information subjects’ interests in developing and
inhabiting their own identities.
Keywords Identity . Narrative . Neurotechnology .
Neurodata . Cognitive privacy . BCI . Neuroimaging .
Information governance
Introduction
Neurotechnologies are used ever more widely in
healthcare, research and by consumers, as well as in
commercial, military, education and judicial settings.
These uses involve the monitoring, collection, analysis
and generation of increasing quantities of information
about the states and functioning of our brains and minds.
This discussion advances the claim that our encounters
with these kinds of information can affect our identities in
ways that warrant serious ethical attention. This claim is
underpinned by my central argument that information
about our own brains and minds can provide important
tools in our construction of coherent, inhabitable identi-
ties – self-conceptions that equip us to make sense of and
navigate our embodied lives. In doing so, this discussion
fills a gap in debates about the ethical concerns and
governance priorities raised by neurotechnologies and
the information they generate. These debates currently
focus chiefly on the ways that those other than the subject
of the information may access and (ab)use this informa-
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and may contribute to misunderstandings about, the eth-
ical significance of whether and how we ourselves are
able to access it and our interests in doing so. This gap
must be filled if the governance of neurotechnologies is
to respond appropriately to the full range of pertinent
interests. This discussion addresses one aspect of that
gap by offering a conceptually and normatively robust
account of the roles of information about our brains and
minds in our construction of our identities, and the nature
of our identity-related interests in our encounters with this
information. The focus here on the identity effects of
information distinguishes this inquiry from those that
explore the direct impacts of the physical presence or
operation of neurotechnologies themselves on users’ self-
conceptions.1 The present inquiry contributes to the less
well-trodden ethical landscape of users’ interests arising
from their encounters with the information generated.
In the discussion that follows, I first introduce the
scope of the kinds of information and technologies with
which I am concerned, before describing the gap in
neuroethics debates that this discussion addresses. In
order to fill this gap, and to explain why it is important
to do so, I outline an account in which our identities are
constituted by our own narratives about who we are. In
doing so I will highlight both the embodied nature of our
identity-constituting narratives and the conditions that
apply if these narratives are to support us in leading our
embodied lives. From these conceptual and normative
foundations, I then build my central proposal: that in-
formation about our brains and minds can play impor-
tant roles in our construction of coherent and inhabitable
identities in ways that give rise to ethically significant
interests. I illustrate this account with examples drawn
from empirical literature reporting patient’s reactions to
information generated by implantable predictive
neurodevices and psychiatric neuroimaging. In conclud-
ing, I highlight some of the ways that information gen-
erated by neurotechnologies might be governed in ways
that respond to information subjects’ interests in devel-
oping and inhabiting their own identities.
Categories of Technology and Information
This discussion is intended to apply to information
about individual users’ brains and minds, collected and
generated by neurotechnologies used in a wide range of
applications and settings.2 I will talk about ‘information
about the brain and the mind’ as a pair, while taking a
non-reductionist view of the mind which holds that,
even if mental events have neural correlates, they are
not wholly reducible to these. And knowledge of some-
one’s brain activity is not equivalent to knowledge of
the qualities or contents of their thoughts or experiences
[6]. While distinguishing information about the brain
and mind, it is nevertheless useful to consider them as a
pair here insofar as ethical concerns about handling of
brain data are often grounded in concerns about the
inferences that may be drawn from these to the health
and functioning of our minds [7].
When using the term ‘neurotechnology’ I will be
referring to those technologies that either collect data
from users’ brains, or collect other kinds of data, for
example physiological or behavioural, from which in-
ferences about users’ brains or minds (or some combi-
nation of the two) are then drawn. These technologies
include structural and functional neuroimaging and
brain-computer interfaces (BCIs). BCIs function by ac-
quiring signals from the brain using implanted or exter-
nal electrodes and relaying these to an external device
where these are analysed to produce outputs, such as
movement of a cursor on a screen [8]. The arguments
and recommendations to be made here are also intended
to apply to technologies such as wearable and mobile
devices that use physiological and behavioural data such
as heart-rate or online activity to make inferences to the
states or functions of the brain or mind, for example,
indicators of mental health status. The purposes for
which neuroimaging and BCI technologies may be used
vary widely. These include monitoring, prediction, di-
agnosis, targeting and delivering therapeutic interven-
tions, device control, communication and entertainment,
in a range of research, clinical, judicial, commercial,
military, educational, and consumer settings [9–11].
Various methods of structural and functional neuroim-
aging – ranging from magnetic resonance imaging
1 There is considerable body of scholarship discussing the effects of
the presence or operation of implanted BCIs, neuroprosthetics and
neuromodulation devices (especially the cognitive, affective and be-
havioural effects of deep brain stimulation (DBS)) on users’ sense of
embodiment or identity (see, for example, [1–5]). In some circum-
stances it may not be possible to draw a neat line between the effects of
information and the effects of the presence or operation of a device.
Though the focus here is on the former, there is likely to be value in
further ethical exploration of the relative contributions and interaction
between these different impacts.
2 References to ‘users’ here is intended to refer to those who use
neurotechnologies for their own purposes or are subject to uses of
neurotechnologies by others (for example radiographers administering
brain imaging), not the parties who administer them. I shall also use the
phrase ‘information subjects’ to refer to this group.
E. Postan
(MRI) to cheaper, more portable, less spatially-precise
methods such as electroencephalography (EEG) – are
used in clinical contexts, for example to identify neural
damage associated with trauma or dementia [10].
Neuroimaging is also widely used in research, both to
address health-related aims and to contribute to basic
understanding of neural functions, cognition,
senses, affective responses and behaviour [11].
Applications of neuroimaging technologies also
extend beyond clinical and research contexts. For
example, it is used in researching consumer pref-
erences [12] and in the justice system (particularly
in the United States), for example to provide mit-
igating evidence of structural anomalies or (more
rarely and controversially) as a form of ‘lie detec-
tion’ [13]. Some commercial services offer direct-
to-consumer (DTC) neuroimaging, purporting to
diagnose mental health conditions [14].
Uses of BCIs span a similarly broad spectrum.
Investigative applications of BCIs using implanted elec-
trodes include assisting paralysed individuals to com-
municate or move objects [8]. Implanted BCIs are used
in healthcare to detect neural events associated with
disease symptoms (one experimental example of which
is discussed further below) and in delivering therapeutic
interventions [15]. Non-invasive BCIs are also widely
available as consumer products. These include, for
example, EEG headsets that are used to control
devices for gaming or personal computing, or to
provide data for health and wellbeing wearables
that purport, in conjunction with associated mobile
apps, to allow users to monitor brain activity, or
seek to modulate it [16].
The pertinent shared feature of the technologies to be
discussed here is their capacity to generate information
about the user’s brain or mind in forms that are (or could
in principle) be accessible by that individual. When
referring to the ‘information generated’ here I intend
this to include data collected by these technologies, as
well as the products of analysis of these data by the
technologies themselves, or by researchers, healthcare
professionals or technicians overseeing their use. As
such, this discussion applies to information about neural
activity and structural features, as well as to inferences
drawn from these about the user’s mental and physical
health, autonomic functions, motor functions, and his
(or her) wider wellbeing. These might include informa-
tion about past events (such as a stroke, or a pattern of
poor quality sleep), about current states of affairs (such
as a diagnosis of advancing Alzheimer’s disease, or
indicators of stress and anxiety), or predictive informa-
tion (such as warnings of an impending seizure, or an
elevated risk of developing a major depressive disorder).
These kinds of information, and how they are com-
municated, will vary considerably in the extent of anal-
ysis and interpretation involved, and in the richness of
their semantic content – ranging from a warning light on
a device signalling seizure risk, to a detailed clinical
diagnosis. They will also differ in their epistemic qual-
ities – that is, in the extent to which they engender
meaningful, reliable and accurate beliefs in the individ-
ual about their brain, mind, or associated capacities and
characteristics. While the central argument of this article
is intended to apply to the kinds of information that can
plausibly be produced by neurotechnologies now (or in
the near future), rather than their more speculative
and hyped capacities (such as their abilities to read
the content of our thoughts [17]) there is still
considerable scope for variability in the specificity
and reliability of the kinds of information that fall
within its purview. This is attributable not only to
the different stages of development of many of
these technologies and the techniques and stan-
dards used for collecting, analysing, validating
and communicating data, but also because in many
cases the information produced will be probabilis-
tic [18, 19]. The relevance of variation in infor-
mation quality will become apparent below.
From Others’ Uses to our Own Encounters
There are at least three pressing high-level reasons why
it is necessary to address how information subjects’
interests may be affected by information generated by
neurotechnologies about their brains and minds. First is
the sheer quantity of information generated by
neurotechnologies – attributable both to the proliferation
of devices and applications as well as the high levels of
data extraction integral to their functions [7]. Secondly,
there is considerable variation in how these kinds of
information are governed, who may have access to them
and for what purposes. These matters are subject to
different regulatory regimes depending on whether, for
example, the information counts as personal data for the
purposes of data protection law, is part of patient re-
cords, classed as research findings, or is commercially
sensitive – each carrying different implications for
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information subjects’ expectations and entitlements to
information generated.3 In some instances (such as
health-tracking wearables) direct communication of in-
formation to the user is integral to the purpose and
function of the device, but this is not the case for
all devices [4]. And, for example, it is not inevi-
table that researchers will provide participants in
neuroscientific studies with resultant findings relat-
ing to their own circumstances, beyond perhaps
serious and actionable health risks [20]. Such var-
iation is not surprising, given the scope of uses
and settings involved, but it does give rise to
questions about whether information subjects’ in-
terests are appropriately protected across all these
domains. Addressing this question requires identi-
fication of the full range of significant interests
likely to be engaged, as well as attention to where
the rules, functions and practices governing the
(non)disclosure of information to users fail to rec-
ognise and protect these interests. Thirdly, there is
a tenacious, but far from self-evident, assumption
that information about our brains and minds is
particularly closely related to, and uniquely reveal-
ing of who we are [21, 22]. This unexamined
assumption cannot to do the explanatory and nor-
mative work often demanded of it in neuroethics
debates.
Given these three factors, the generation and
management of informat ion genera ted by
neurotechnologies are not a novel areas for ethical
concern. But these factors also explain why it is
necessary to ensure this territory is well-mapped
and that any relevant and ethically significant in-
terests are properly identified and characterised. It
is here that I wish to suggest that there is an
important gap to be filled. Ethical discussions
concerning information gathered and generated by
neurotechnologies tend to be dominated by ques-
tions about how parties – other than information
subjects themselves – might (ab)use it for research,
healthcare, public health, commercial, criminal jus-
tice, administrative, or surveillance purposes (for
example see [23–25]). Consequently, concerns re-
lating to information subjects’ interests tend to
focus on the validity and clinical utility of the
information, appropriate justifications and consent
for the kinds of third party uses just listed, and
anxieties about invasions of their privacy and con-
sequent discrimination or stigmatisation, rather
than the impacts that information subjects' own
encounters with and uses of this information might
have directly on them, let alone on their identities.
The specific gap this discussion seeks to fill is
the absence of serious and well-characterised ethi-
cal attention to how information subjects’ encoun-
t e r s w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n g e n e r a t e d b y
neurotechnologies may impact on their capacities
to develop, make sense of and inhabit their iden-
tities. By ‘identity’ here I mean that which
characterises us as individuals and provides the
foundations for our practical engagement with the
world and other people. For example, the impacts
of information access on our interests in self-
constitution are not addressed in Marcello Ienca’s
and Roberto Andorno’s call for a suite of new
‘neuro’ rights to address the threats posed by
emerg ing neuro techno log ies [26] , in the
‘Neuroethics Guiding Principles for the NIH
BRAIN Initiative’ [27], or the OECD’s 2019
‘Recommendation of the Council on Responsible
Innovation in Neurotechnology’ [28]. And they
are only briefly alluded to amongst 2016 UN
Global Neuroethics Summit’s guiding questions
for international brain initiatives [29]. In notable
contrast, the potential impacts of genetic informa-
tion on our identities has attracted considerable,
though not always unproblematic, ethical and reg-
ulatory attention [30–33].4
Ethical concerns about how others may use informa-
tion about us are legitimate ones. Those relating to
privacy and unauthorised access may be particularly
pressing. This is due not only to the potentially clinically
or personally significant, sensitive, or stigmatising na-
ture of information about our neurological and mental
health or cognitive capacities and functions, but also to
3 Which regulatory regime or governance approach applies may also
be ambiguous. For example, technologies such as mental wellbeing
apps are ambiguously situated between the domains of healthcare and
consumer entertainment.
4 In parallel to the position I set out here, I have argued elsewhere that
genetic may play a significant role in our identity-constituting narra-
tives, and also that the ways that identity, and the normative aspects of
the relationship between identity and genetic information, are not
always well-conceived or fully articulated in existing discussions –
for example, where these appeal to, or are assumed to appeal to, a
geneticised view of the identity as pre-determined by genetic traits or
parentage [33, 34]
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the fact that neurodata may (like genomic data) be
sufficiently rich and detailed to be inherently identifying
of individuals and disorders [23]. This kind of ‘numer-
ical identification’ of the source of information with a
known individual is important, but not the sense of
identity with which I am concerned in this discussion.5
And, although the ways that others judge, categorise and
treat us based on what they infer from information about
us may well affect our identities in the ‘self-conception’
sense in which I am interested, these indirect identity
impacts are not the focus of the present discussion
inasmuch as the aim here is to shine a light on the ethical
significance of individuals’ own encounters with infor-
mation about themselves. Over the following sections I
will propose and illustrate a normative conception of the
role that our own encounters with information about our
brains and our minds may play in our development of
our identities.
I do not wish to imply that the possible impacts of
users ’ access to informat ion genera ted by
neurotechnologies on their self-conceptions have been
wholly neglected in neuroethical debates. Potential
identity effects have been discussed in relation to
neuro-related wearables and in empirical studies of clin-
ical applications of fMRI and implantable BCIs (see, for
example, [9, 35–38]). Some of these studies are
discussed further below. However, I will suggest that
these existing accounts would benefit from more robust
conceptual and normative foundations if suggestions
about consequences for identity are to have purchase
and be taken seriously in information governance deci-
sion-making. Specifically, these analyses do not always
offer clear accounts of what is meant by identity, what
roles information about the brain andmindmight play in
our identities, or why these roles are sufficiently signif-
icant to attract ethical attention. My aim here is to
provide these missing foundations. In the following
sections I will say more about the particular conception
of identity on which I will focus, examine how encoun-
ters with information about our brains and minds may
contribute to or undermine identities thus conceived,
and explain why these impacts matter, in order to
ground my central claim – that the identity impacts of
our encounters with information about our brains and
minds warrant serious ethical attention.
A Normative, Embodied, Narrative Conception
of Identity
I want to suggest that applying the lens of identity as
constituted by a particular kind of embodied first-person
narrative provides a means for appreciating the ethical
significance of the role of information about our brains
and minds in our development and occupation of our
identities. I will propose a strongly normative account of
narrative identity-constitution, which seeks to explain
why narrative changes matter and engage important
moral identity-specific interests.6 Narrative conceptions
of identity have achieved particular prominence in de-
bates about the identity effects of deep brain stimulation
(DBS) [39–41]. Here, however, I am applying it to the
impacts of information rather than physical
interventions.
As noted above, in talking about identity here I am not
(directly) addressing questions of numerical identity –
that is, questions of sameness and persistence of entities.
My focus is upon identity in, what Marya Schechtman
terms, the “characterization” sense [42 p.1]. That is, the
sense we are concerned with when we inquire what
someone is like, whether their behaviour is characteristic
of them, or whether an experience has changed them.
And this concerns the totality of who someone is, not
merely unitary social identifiers or labels – though these
may be part of the picture. The concept of identity I am
referring to is also a practical one [43]. That is, I shall
take it that someone’s identity is much more than an inert
descriptor. It provides their ‘first person perspective’ and
the foundations for their interpretations and evaluations,
motives, life projects and relationships, and thus the
framework and conditions for their agency and engage-
ment with the world [44].
Following writers including Schechtman and
Catriona Mackenzie I will take it that our identities in
this practical, characterisation sense are constituted by
5 Though it is not the focus of the present discussion, neuroethical
debates are appropriately concerned with identity in this numerical
sense, for example in circumstances where neurodata is sufficiently
rich that its analysis reveals its source as a particular individual (‘iden-
tifies’ one with the other) thus, permitting the attribution of traits or
disorders revealed by the data to this individual, undermining their
privacy and placing them at risk of stigma or discrimination. This kind
of identification may be a particular risk where machine learning is
used to analyse large quantities of data [23].
6 In these respects, the account proposed here will differ from those
that those that argue that almost any change to one’s self-narrative is a
morally neutral part of narrative development, or that any concerns
about narrative impacts are at root those about harm to autonomy (see,
for example, [39, 40]).
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our self-told stories of whowe are [42, 44]. These stories
are woven from our experiences and characteristics,
what we have done and plan to do, our attitudes and
values, our roles, and our relationships to others. They
are narratives in that they are temporally extended and,
critically, because they are not simply receptacles
of everything that we experience. Rather they are
selective, the product of interpretation and editing.
And, as such, they are continually evolving in
response to new experiences and interpretive con-
texts . I wil l also fol low Schechtman and
Mackenzie in holding that our self-constituting
narratives are first-personal.7 This is because the
sense-making and unifying nature of narrativity,
and the role of our self-narratives in grounding
our evaluative and practical capacities (as de-
scribed further below) are premised on a single
(albeit complex and evolving), internally-
referential perspective of the particular individual
who interprets, judges and acts. Which is not to
say that our identities are, or can be, constructed
in isolation, or that we can never be confused or
mistaken about our characteristics. On the con-
trary, self-constitution, on this conception, is an
inherently relational, “dialogical” activity [46,
p33]. And our relationships, roles and others’
views of what we are like contribute to and con-
strain our first-personal accounts of who we are
[47].
Narrative self-constitution theories are not without
detractors [see, for example, 48, 49]. However, I would
suggest that features of narrativity, such as plotting,
coherence or fragmentation, capture the phenomenolo-
gy of self-conception, what we care about when we
desire to be a particular kind of person, and what we
fear about losing our sense of who we are. And, asMary
Walker argues, narratives offer the kind of “epistemo-
logical strength” that we attribute to our identities – the
capacity to make sense of ourselves and our experiences
and explain why we acted as we did, or why we value
particular things [50, p.66]. I suggest that these are
exactly the kinds of experiences and capacities wemight
have in mind if we are concerned or optimistic about
how information about our brains our minds could affect
how who we understand ourselves to be.
One possible objection to narrative theories is that, if
our identities are constituted by our self-told stories, this
might imply that we are free to invent whatever kind of
identity we wish, no matter how fanciful [49]. However
narrativity here is a normative not just a descriptive
concept. We do not want to have just any identity
narrative, but to develop a narrative worth having. It is
this normativity that introduces limits on what can func-
tion as identity-constituting narrative and thus precludes
unfettered self-invention, or at least its desirability [42,
44, 51]. The suggestion here is that an identity narrative
that serves us well in in leading a fulfilling existence
will, firstly, be one that supports our interpretive, eval-
uative, capacities and practical engagement with the
world. Agency and autonomy are amongst these capac-
ities, but by no means exhaust them. They also include
our abilities to make sense of who we are and our place
in the world, to make judgements about what is valuable
or admirable, to plan, and to sustain long-term projects,
commitments and relationships. And, secondly such a
narrative will be one that provides us with a
recognisable and inhabitable sense of who we are. By
this I mean one that allows us to ‘live with ourselves’,
that includes meaningful roles, and that is itself intelli-
gible to us while also supporting us in making sense of
and navigating our lives. These qualities of coherence,
intelligibility and inhabitability alone may not be suffi-
cient for leading a rich and fulfilling life. Nevertheless, I
would suggest that the capacities, attributes and experi-
ences they support are they relatively uncontroversial
aspects of desirable human existence, in that we tend to
value them, and they reflect the kinds of elements com-
monly cited by as important by ethical theories that seek
to enumerate universal and objective conditions for
wellbeing [52, 53]. However, not just any form or
substance of narrative will be capable of supporting
these qualities, and it is here that we encounter both
the constraints on what comprises a worthwhile practi-
cal identity and the basis for our identity-related
interests.
Narratives capable of supporting these desirable fea-
tures will, I suggest, exhibit four qualities. The first is
that the narrative is internally intelligible and coherent,
making sense on its own terms, so that the individual has
a reasonably clear sense of who they are and a firm,
reasonably integrated (both diachronically and syn-
chronically) foundation from which to interpret, judge,
7 Proponents of narrative theories of identity differ as to the extent to
which our narratives should be seen as first-personal, co-authored by
others, or strike a balance between our own and others’ perspectives on
who we are (for example, Françoise Baylis offers an account of this last
kind [45]).
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act.8 The second is that it is reasonably intelligible to
others with whom the individual lives and interacts. The
third is that the narrative reflects the individual’s expe-
riences of and encounters with their own embodied
states, abilities and (mal)functions, their environment
and relationships to others. The fourth is that that the
kinds of self-descriptors of which the narrative com-
prises will, as far as possible, be ones the individual
welcomes or, at least, does not find wholly alienating or
unbearable.9 Each of these constraints may be met to a
greater or lesser extent, reflecting the fact that we have
only limited control over our circumstances and that life
inevitably introduces disruptive, hard-to-comprehend,
and unwelcome plotlines and we each have differing
capacities to accommodate these in coherent and inhab-
itable stories.
The first three of these requirements owe much to
Schechtman’s proposed twin constraints upon identity-
constituting narratives: that they must be amenable to
“articulation” and “cohere with reality” [42 p.114,
p.119]. However, Schechtman justifies the second of
these constraints with reference only to the need for
our identities to be recognisable to others to allow us
to function in social relationships. She does not ac-
knowledge the significance of our materiality to our
self-narratives, that we are also beings who think, sense,
feel and act in embodied ways.10 Because of these
features, I suggest, there is a parallel need for our self-
narratives to be responsive to the “basic contours of
reality” so that they are also intelligible and inhabitable
to us in the context of our material, embodied lives [42
p.123].11 The fact that our self-narratives, are inescap-
ably embodied has been recognised and developed by
several theorists including Mackenzie, Kim Atkins, and
Mary Walker [40, 55, 56]. Here I seek to go beyond the
conceptual foundations these authors offer, to make
claims about the ethical significance of the epistemic
and interpretive roles that information about our brains
and minds can play in constructing and inhabiting em-
bodied identities.
In asserting that our identity-constituting narratives
are embodied I mean to make several interdependent
descriptive and normative claims. First, at the most basic
level, our stories of who we are will inevitably contain
plotlines about our bodies and embodied minds and be
shaped and mediated by our experiences of these – for
example, our health, senses, gender, or reproductive
status. Secondly, our capacities to construct intelligible
and inhabitable self-narratives may be enabled or
constrained by aspects of our embodiment, for example,
our cognitive capacities or mental health, or how com-
fortable or alienating we find particular bodily charac-
teristics [57].12 Thirdly, a critical aspect of developing
and maintaining a coherent and inhabitable practical
identity involves constructing a self-narrative that re-
mains sustainable and intelligible when confronted by
our embodied experiences, capacities and limitations –
including those of our brains, cognition, senses, moods
and health – while also providing a framework that
supports us in making sense of and navigating our
experiences and encounters with these. And while our
narratives will inevitably be disrupted by and evolve in
response to new embodied experiences, we benefit to
the extent that they can also weather these experiences
(or at least quotidian ones) without deep or permanent
harm to their intelligibility, inhabitability or coherence.
The key normative implications of what I have said
in this section are that our identities are not just some-
thing we have by default. Rather, as their authors, we are
active in developing them. And they serve us well
insofar as they exhibit the coherence, intelligibility and
inhabitability that underpin our sense of who we are, our
practical and evaluative capacities, and our unique per-
spectives the world. The degree to which they exhibit
8 Narrative ‘coherence’ here refers to an ideal, rather than a readily
achievable state. Minimising internal contradictions and tensions is
valuable insofar as our identities provide a consistent perspective from
which to interpret, judge, act. However, the complexities of most lives
make eradication of all such features unlikely if not impossible and any
coherence achieved is likely to be imperfect as well as, in Mackenzie’s
and Walker’s words, “dynamic and provisional” [40 p.381].
9 It seems likely that there will be a degree of interdependence as well
as mutual delimiting between these four considerations. For example,
achieving coherence between one’s narrative and our lived experiences
will help to sustain the narrative’s internal coherence insofar as it
includes aspects of these experiences.
10 Schechtman’s account in ‘The Constitution of Selves’ relegates the
relevance of our bodies to questions of numerical identities insofar as
they allow other people to reidentify us [42].
11 Schechtman is not alone in presenting a peculiarly rationalist –
relational, but disembodied – view of narrative self-constitution, sim-
ilar observations may be made of the accounts proposed by Charles
Taylor and Alasdair Macintyre [46, 54].
12 With the exception perhaps of serious cognitive and psychiatric
conditions, the ways and extent to which embodied states and experi-
ences impact on our capacities to construct coherent, inhabitable self-
narratives is not inherent, but rather it seems likely to depend to a large
degree on what particular embodied characteristics – such as our
gender or (dis)ability – means in any particular social and cultural
context and this what this implies for the narratives available to us
and the recognition of those narratives by others (for further discussion,
see [47]).
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these features will vary and, to this extent, our projects
of self-constitution may fare better or worse. However,
even though we are the authors of our own narratives,
the success of our identity projects (whether they fare
better or worse) depends not only on our own abilities as
storytellers. It also depends on the ways that our lived
contexts, which include our brains and embodiedminds,
support or hinder our efforts. And – because narration is
inherently an interpretive endeavour – the construction
of a coherent, inhabitable self-narrative will also cru-
cially depend on the epistemic and hermeneutic tools we
have available to us to help us make sense of, give
meaning to and prioritise these lived experiences.
Neurotechnologies as Sources of Narrative Tools
My central claim in this paper is that information about
the states and functions of our brains and minds gener-
ated by neurotechnologies can provide precisely the
kinds of epistemic and hermeneutic tools just mentioned
– tools that contribute to the content of our identities, but
also, crucially, to the extent that they ‘fare better or
worse’. This information fulfils this latter role not be-
cause we are essentially our brains (or even our minds),
nor because neuro-information provides privileged in-
sights into who we ‘really are’, but because our brains
and embodied minds are part of the inescapable context
of our lives, and thus of our stories of who we are. Fresh,
or otherwise inaccessible, information about these con-
texts can assist us in the interpretive tasks of developing
and maintaining these stories. At perhaps the most
straightforward level, then, my claim is that information
generated by neurotechnologies may supply new or
revised modes of self-description to our identity narra-
tives.13 For example, incidental findings from a routine
MRI scan may reveal that someone is a stroke survivor;
a research study investigating correlations between neu-
ral activity and susceptibility to psychiatric illness may
generate findings that indicate that a participant is at
significantly increased risk ofmajor depressive disorder;
or a wearable fitness monitor may display data telling
the user that they are a particularly light sleeper. The
individuals concerned may or may not then incorporate
these new self-descriptors into their self-narratives, po-
tentially modifying or replacing existing ones.
Moving beyond this, the information generated by
neurotechnologies could contribute by indirect means,
by instigating a course of action or changing our per-
spectives in ways that then feed into our narratives. For
example, confirmation of a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s
disease by a structural brain scan might lead a patient
to re-evaluate their priorities, bring forward a long-
deferred project, or participate in clinical research into
dementia. Or a user of a recreational BCI neurofeedback
device might seek to re-evaluate their work patterns and
attitudes towards parenting upon observing that they
receive on-screen indications of relaxed and meditative
brain state more readily at the end of a day spent with
their family than at their workplace.
Similar kinds of information could also serve the
coherence and inhabitability of these narratives by fill-
ing in gaps, reframing, or offering context and explana-
tions for the kinds of experiences we have as beings that
lead embodied, thinking, feeling lives and thus provid-
ing us with ways of anticipating, understanding or nav-
igating these. For example, wemight imagine a situation
in which receiving a diagnosis of an autism spectrum
disorder based in part on functional neuroimaging data
could help someone to understand and feel more confi-
dent in the atypical ways they view the world, and to feel
solidarity with others with similar diagnoses. Or data
gathered by a wearable device indicating poor sleep
might allow someone to make sense of recent changes
in their moods and inability to cope with their workload.
A narrative conception of identity offers a way of
understanding how each of these examples of potential
information-initiated changes and reinterpretations can
be seen as much more than instances of acquiring new
social identifiers or altering our behaviours. As part of a
wider self-narrative they represent potentially far-
reaching – beneficial or detrimental, welcome or unwel-
come – edits to or (re)interpretations of an individual’s
identity. My central claim here is that these changes are
ethically significant insofar as they contribute to the
inhabitability, intelligibility and coherence of our self-
narratives. This is because we, and the qualities and
richness of our lives, are benefitted or harmed in non-
trivial ways by the extent to which we are able to make
sense of who we are and navigate our lives accordingly.
For these reasons, we can have significant interests in
whether and in what ways encounter information about
our brains and minds.
13 Although I have described it as ‘straightforward’ here, the very
nature of narratives – as interpretive wholes that change and are
changed by the meaning of their parts – means that it is unlikely that
a change of self-descriptor would ever be just that, a discrete edit
without wider interpretive ramifications.
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Before looking at two examples to highlight the
nature of these interests in more detail, I wish to address
four possible misconceptions about the nature of the
claim made above.
First, in arguing that our self-narratives are essential-
ly embodied I am not asserting that we are, or should be,
defined by the characteristics and functions of our brains
or minds, nor that we are obliged to incorporate all and
any available information about themwholesale into our
self-narratives.14 As with any aspect of our lives, such
inclusions will be selective and interpretive. Exclusion
of, even prominent aspects of our neural functions,
health or mental states from our narratives, can be part
of intelligible self-constitution.
Secondly, my claim is not that information derived
from neurotechnologies is unique in fulfilling the kinds of
narrative roles described above. In other contexts, differ-
ent kinds of information about our bodies, biology or
health – for example, genetic, reproductive or physiolog-
ical – could occupy parallel roles.15 Indeed, my proposal
that much of the ‘identity value’ of information from
neurotechnologies lies in its instrumental, sense-making
or contextualising potential, leaves space to recognise
how other types of bioinformation could perform similar
functions in relevant circumstances.16 Empirical studies
provide some indication as to why our encounters with
and experiences of our brains and minds, and thus neuro-
information, might neverthless perhaps be particularly
likely to be viewed as significant to our identities. Some
of this may be attributable to cultural conceptions of the
brain as the seat of the self, and (problematic) popular
representat ions of the powerful insights of
neurotechnologies, for example to reveal our ‘true’ traits
[61, 62]. Some of it may also be to do with the “special
significance” of brain, and injury or illness affecting it,
due to the potentially grave and pervasive implications its
functioning for our lives [63, p6]. Some studies, however,
indicate participants hold equivocal views about such
significance [22]. It is also possible that the perceived
precision, quantifiability, and objectivity of information
generated by neurotechnologies plays a role [36]. This is
a fruitful area for further investigation.
However, my intention here is not to make excep-
tionalist claims about the identity-significance of infor-
mation from neurotechnologies, but rather to highlight
that the potential impacts of these technologies on users’
identities, and associated identity-related interests, ex-
tend to the information they generate in ways that war-
rant appropriate characterisation and serious ethical at-
tention. Moreover, the aim is to clarify that these inter-
ests obtain while eschewing both exceptionalist and
essentialist assumptions about the nature or contents of
our identities, by explaining why such interests need not
– indeed, should not – be premised on attributing the
identity-significance of neuro-information to either the
achievement of a ‘complete’ identity, or its putative
capacity to reveal superior or corrective insights into
what we are ‘really like’ – which brings me to the third
point of clarification.
The proposal that information generated by
neurotechnologies could provide valuable context and
explanations is not the same as claiming that it does so
because it reveals the ‘truth’ about our identities’. For
example, Walker has (sceptically) examined the possi-
bility that some neuroscientific findings –for example,
those that purport to indicate how our effective motives
differ from our acknowledged ones – could be
interpreted as presenting a challenge to the truth of our
self-narratives, or offering correctives to these, by re-
vealing where our ‘real’ characteristics depart from the
stories we tell about them [50].17 According to a narra-
tive conception of identity, however, there is no true
identity that precedes and trumps our own accounts of
14 Objections to bio-essentialist views of identity – as both empirically
unsound and morally objectionable – are familiar from ethical debates
about geneticisation and the identity-significance of genetic informa-
tion [31, 58]. These debates, however, sometimes make unwarranted
assumptions that any claim to identity-value must be grounded the in
claims about the essential value of genetic information, rather than the
kind of contingent, instrumental value proposed here.
15 Of all categories of biological or health-related information, the
identity relevance of genetic information has perhaps received the
greatest attention in bioethical, philosophical, social science and legal
literature, and in the law, particularly where entitlements to knowledge
of genetic illness and genetic parentage are concerned, and in the
context of direct-to-consumer genetic testing (see, for example, 30–
32). However, while the qualitative impacts of genetic information on
identity are widely discussed, the normative significance of its role the
construction of practical identity narratives remains largely unexplored,
with the notable exception of some analyses of knowledge of genetic
parentage [see, for example, 59, 60].
16 I have argued elsewhere that a wide variety of personal
bioinformation about different aspects of our bodily and biological
attributes and relationships, generated in many different contexts could
play ethically significant – though contingent – roles in the construc-
tion of our self-narratives, and provided examples of the variety of
ways in which they might do so (see, [33, 34]).
17 Lisa Bortolotti has made similar claims in suggesting that reliable
information about our own minds, such as that generated through
psychological experiments, is “necessary for self-authorship” because
it allows us to develop more “accurate” self-narratives that align with
more closely with our actual attitudes and motivations [64, p.687].
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who we are [44]. Subject to the constraints noted above,
it is these accounts that constitute our real identities and
it is with reference to them that we appropriately and
meaningfully explain and characterise who we are.
Moreover, the nature and meaning of our motives, atti-
tudes and behaviours derive from the embodied and
relational narratives of which they are a part, not from
information about neural activity or, at least, not from
this taken in isolation. According to the account I have
offered here, the potentially valuable ‘explanatory’ pow-
er of neuro-information lies not in revealing our identi-
ties, but in providing contextual insights into our brains
or minds that can assist us in our interpretive endeavours
in constructing and making sense of our identities in
light of our lived experiences.18
The suggestion that information generated by
neurotechnologies can provide insights into who we ‘re-
ally are’ is, however, integral to claims that some
neurotechnologies pose risks to “mental privacy” due to
their putative (current or imminent) capacities to read our
minds [23, 26, 65–68]. For example, Ienca and Andorno
call for a new human right to mental privacy to provide
legal protection against the involuntary revelation of
users’ “intentions, views and attitudes” by neuroimaging
technologies [26 p.3].19 Such concerns are often couched
in a Cartesian-flavoured assumptions that our own minds
are (and should be) private and inscrutable domains, to
which we ourselves usually have direct and relatively
uncomplicated access. This is reflected, for example, in
Ienca and Andorno’s description of the mind as “an
unassailable fortress” demarcated by the “boundaries of
the skull”, and Paul Wolpe’s references to the mind as
“humanity’s one impenetrable refuge” and “the
privileged domain of my individual functioning” [26]
p.1, p.2; 71 p.85, p.86]. Concerns about mind-reading
by neurotechnologies are problematic, insofar as they
rely on a neuro-reductive view of the mind. They also
exemplify the ethical preoccupation, noted above, with
how others, rather than information subject’s themselves,
might use our neuro-information. And to the extent that
they imply that ethical concerns relating to neuro-
information and identity arise chiefly in relation to the
risks of others’ gaining illegitimate insights into our
‘inner selves’, while our own encounters with this infor-
mation do not raise comparable concerns as we already
have direct access to our own minds, they risk being mis-
directive as to the epistemic powers and potential value of
neuro-information to information subjects. We do not
have perfect or uncomplicated insights into the states,
functioning or health of our brains and minds. But nor
does such information open a window into the naked
truth about who we are. Information generated by
neurotechnologies can provide complementary and inter-
pretive materials that help us to make sense of our expe-
riences, and to locate these within or exclude them from
our accounts of who we are, in ways that engage signif-
icant interests.
Fourth and finally, my aim is not to suggest that
information about our brains and minds will neces-
sarily make unequivocally welcome or valuable con-
tributions to the inhabitability our identities. On the
contrary, some might be neither welcome nor valu-
able. For example, someone might experience diag-
noses of serious mental illness as distressing and
stigmatising in ways that make their identity pro-
foundly uncomfortable and difficult to inhabit, or as
undermining self-descriptors or projects that are cen-
tral to their identity. In some cases this might repre-
sent a profound and disruption to their sense of who
they are. It is important, however, to distinguish un-
welcome from detrimental effects of information
here. Marked shifts in our sense of who we are may
be welcome or unwelcome, valuable or detrimental.20
As I discuss further below, our interests do not nec-
essarily lie in preserving the contents and shape of our
identities in unchanging form. Rather, they lie in
being in a position to maintain or restore – as far as
possible – the coherence, intelligibil ity and
inhabitability of our self-narratives through change
and in response to the vagaries of lives, our bodies
and minds, so that we are equipped us to understand
who we are and what we value, and to engage practi-
cally with the world. Sometimes this will entail a
18 The kind of ‘truth’ claims rejected here are those relating to truth
about one’s identity. It is of course possible that someone could wish to
learn the truth about an aspect of her body or health – for example the
state of brain damage she sustained following trauma – in order to
construct her self-narrative. Seeking this kind of truth is not only
compatible with, but central to, the claims made here.
19 A number of authors are sceptical about the possibility of or threat
posed by mind-reading, citing not only the potentially contingent
capabilities of current technologies, but also the category mistake of
equating knowledge of neural activity with knowledge of the content
and qualities of our thoughts (see, for example, [6, 69, 70]).
20 Distinctions between the preservation of identity and how welcome
or valuable such preservation is are discussed and illustrated in the
literature discussing the behavioural and personality impacts of deep
brain stimulation (see, for example, [39, 72, 73].
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change, even a marked one, in our self-conceptions.
And information about our brains or minds may play
an important role in sense-making through such
changes. For example, a psychiatric diagnosis that is
initially experienced as distressing and unwelcome
might, for some individuals, eventually serve a valu-
ab le ro le by enhancing the coherence and
inhabitability of their self-narratives by, for example,
offering explanations for periods of psychological
distress or disorientation [57].21
The value, desirability, or even pertinence, of partic-
ular information to someone’s identity narrative is not
inevitable, and will depend on their particular circum-
stances, cultural environment and existing self-narra-
tive. It will be clear from what I have said so far,
however, that my position stands in contrast to a con-
cerns raised by some, specifically in relation to infor-
mation communicated by consumer neurotechnologies,
that neuro-information might be intrinsically detrimen-
tal to self-understanding where its objectifying and ma-
terial focus supplants the putatively more direct, phe-
nomenologically rich and authentic insights of our own
senses and introspection [9, 75]. If wholesale usurping
of direct experience was to occur, such fears might be
warranted but, short of this, I am proposing that quanti-
fied information about our materials selves can have a
valuable complementary role to play, offering welcome
additional insights, filling important explanatory gaps,
or providing appropriate interpretive context [76].
There is, however, one kind of neurotechnology-
generated information that is unlikely ever to make
valuable contributions to our self-narratives, even if we
welcome it. This is information that fails to provide
accurate, reliable, or meaningful insights about the states
or functioning of our brains or minds, or at least fails to
do so without making these limitations clear and com-
prehensible. The risk lies in our using information of
dubious epistemic quality to re-interpret or construct a
self-narrative incorporating erroneous beliefs about
these aspects of our lives. The concerns here are, first,
that such a narrative will provide a poor foundation for
interpreting and navigating our embodied experiences
and, second, that an identity narrative constructed using
these tools is rendered vulnerable to dissonance with
future experiences. As such, unreliable information rep-
resents a dual threat to the coherence and inhabitability
or our identities, which I discuss further below.
Having set the grounds for and mapped the bound-
aries of my central claim – that information about our
brains and minds generated by neurotechnologies can
provide important epistemic and hermeneutic tools in
the construction of coherent, inhabitable, embodied
identity narratives – I will now turn to look at two
examples that illustrate it in greater depth. These exam-
ples are drawn from empirical studies in which the
authors have explored (possible) identity impacts of
two different applications of neurotechnologies.
However, the authors’ analyses do not offer a unified
underlying conceptual account of the roles that neuro-
information may play in our identity narratives or, more
importantly, to explain why these roles engage signifi-
cant interests and, thus, why information disclosure
decisions and methods are of moral significance for
irreducibly identity-grounded reasons. The account I
have proposed adds a critical layer through which to




This example concerns BCI neural implants that moni-
tor and analyse brain activity associated with epileptic
seizures in users with a history of treatment-refractory
epilepsy and warn them about the onset of seizures [77].
The user is alerted by visual or auditory signals on worn
or handheld devices, giving them the opportunity to take
medication or otherwise prepare. The following discus-
sion focuses on the potential identity impacts of this
kind of predictive information.22
One small qualitative study conducted semi-
structured interviews with six participants in a trial of
this kind of predictive BCI, to explore users’
21 One example of this, albeit from a different context, may be found in
some studies investigating the reactions of some donor-conceived
adults to learning of their donor parentage where despite the initial
distressing disruption of their existing self-conception they value hav-
ing this knowledge [74]).
22 The information provided by such devices is a visual/sound alert
rather than detailed verbal output. However, its semantic content can be
understood as extending to how this alert is interpreted by the user in
conjunction with, for example, guidance from their clinicians about
what it indicates and how they should respond, as well as their own
understanding of managing their epilepsy. This is reflected in the
language used, for example, by Gilbert and co-authors when they refer
to these alerts as “predictive and advisory” [78 p. 4].
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experiences, including any postoperative impacts on
their “sense of self” and whether using the device had
changed who they are or their “sense of control” [38
p.11, p12, 78, 79]. The authors conclude that only two
of the six participants recounted experiences that
amounted to a changing (sense of) self. As described
below, of the two they identify as having had such
experiences, the authors’ analysis corresponds with sev-
eral aspects of the theory-based proposals about the
identity impacts of information in the preceding sec-
tions. However, valuable as these empirical insights
are, I wish to suggest that the existing analysis reflects
a somewhat restricted view of the nature and sig-
nificance of identity impacts and the role of infor-
mation in this. Without departing from the avail-
able evidence, it may be possible to offer more
theoretically and normatively nuanced analyses
with which to inform the ethical implications of
uses of these kinds of neurotechnologies.
I will first address findings relating to two partici-
pants who reported experiencing impacts on their (sense
of) self. The first of these participants reports that, “I
found myself changing…it changed my confidence, [the
device] changed my abilities – it changed how stressed I
was…With the device I felt I could do anything – I can
do everything I wanted to do I was more capable of
making good decisions…it gave me a new lease on life”
[38 p.6]. This participant also describes how her epilep-
sy had previously long been a source of anguish and “an
opposition to me” [38 p.5]. The authors of the study, do
not use the term ‘identity’ in analysing these findings,
but it is implicit in their description of using the BCI as
having “affected her aspirational goals and augmented
her activities as part of the process of self-definition and
self-expression” [38 p.8]. In doing so they echo the
suggestions I have made above – that information about
neural activity may enable the independence and control
that are central to our constitution of our own identities.
These findings also highlight ways in which identity
changes can amount to more than mere epiphenomena
or pleasing experiences. They can be practically effica-
cious, in an individual’s agency and their projects of
self-building. One aspect that the authors’ analysis does
not bring out so clearly, however, is the implication –
signalled by the participant reporting that “with this
device I found myself” – that predictive information
supplied the BCI allowed the user feel more comfortable
in her own identity as someone with epilepsy, and to
reinterpret the meaning of being epileptic and how this
colours other aspects of her identity such her decision-
making [38 p.5]. The value of this outcome may be
appreciated when viewed in terms of the importance of
the inhabitability of our accounts of who we are.
In contrast, a second participant, who describes how
she had previously not characterised herself as epileptic
and “pretended that [her epilepsy] didn’t really exist”,
reports that the alerts delivered by the BCI “made me
feel like I was just sick all the time…like I was different
to everyone else” and as if she “didn’t have control over
what [she] was going to do” [38 p.7]. These findings
usefully highlight the ways that information about our
brains could be detrimental to our identities, imposing
unwanted or stigmatising self-descriptors or by conflict-
ing with our existing, preferred accounts of who we are.
In analysing this participant’s views the authors interpret
the negative experiences of the second participant as
being rooted in a “dramatic clash” and lack of corrobo-
ration between the information disclosed by the device
and “the patient’s self-image and self-narrative” [38
p.9].23 This indeed captures a crucial part of this infor-
mation’s impact. However, they do not go further to
inquire why such a conflict might be problematic in
ways that go beyond feelings of distress or “loss of
control” [40 , p.9]. Focusing on (even serious) affective
changes and experiences of control alone risks
overlooking further reasons why we may, or may not,
have interests in preserving our existing sense of who
we are or in being confronted by experiences that threat-
en this. In this example, the participant’s response indi-
cates that the disruption to her existing self-conception
is indeed contrary to her interests because it threatens
her ability to ‘live with’ who she is and to have a
intelligible sense of self that provides a firm foundation
from which she can act and to engage with the world.
But, as discussed below, preservation of an existing
narrative in itself is not inevitably valuable.
The findings from this study make a vital contribu-
tion by highlighting the potential identity impacts of
information generated by a particular neurotechnology.
The authors analysis of their findings differs from one
premised in ideas related to narrativity, as it is conducted
through a lens in which ethically significant identity
23 Although the authors use the term “self-narrative” here, this does not
signal that they employ a theoretical framework of narrative self-
constitution. Rather, in accordance with to the phenomenological
qualitative research methods used in the study, this term appears to
be used simply to refer to the account that participants give of their own
experiences [38].
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changed is rendered in terms of “self-estrangement” [38,
p.7]. Self-estrangement is characterised as involving an
abrupt and involuntary change in an individual’s quali-
tative experience of self, such that they are unable to
access or identify with who they were beforehand [38,
80]. Estrangement is described as “deteriorative” when
associated with unwelcome changes, distress and loss of
control, or “restorative” when associated with welcome
changes, including the individual’s perceptions of en-
hanced capacities or reinstatement of their ‘real self’ [38,
p.8]. However, restorative estrangement is not presented
as unequivocally beneficial insofar as it is associated
with “distorted perceptions” and alienation from one’s
“previous self” [ibid].
While recognising that self-estrangement may well
capture the experiences of several participants in this
study, I would like to suggest that an analysis framed in
terms of narrative self-constitution could offer some
alternative, or differently nuanced, ways of thinking
about the impacts of this predictive information that
draw out a wider range of identity effects and the nature
of their ethical significance.
For example, the authors suggest that the first partic-
ipant discussed above acquires a “new postoperative
identity” becoming ‘estranged ‘from her former one
and that, even though she welcomes this, it is neverthe-
less a cause for ethical concern [38, p.7]. However, a
narrative lens invites us to query whether an even abrupt
change in our experience of self necessarily represents
either alienation from a former self, or something detri-
mental (or of ambivalent value). A narrative conception
regards change as inherent to our identities.24 Even
dramatic changes in how we see ourselves, our charac-
teristics, and our values, may be consistent with a
retaining a persisting, intelligible and inhibitable identi-
ty, provided we are able to tell a unifying story that
incorporates the change and able to reflect upon and
interpret earlier chapters in light of later ones [81]. Of
course, this is exactly what estrangement precludes.
However, I suggest that it is at least plausible that the
testimony of the first participant could reflect a kind of
acute, yet nevertheless intelligible narrative transition –
rather than estrangement – and be valuable to her.
Dramatic identity change may be positively in
someone’s interests to the extent that it better equips
them to make sense of who they are through altering
circumstances or to navigate their experiences of living
with a serious illness such as epilepsy. Of course, not all
changes are innocuous let alone valuable. Some narra-
tive disruptions may be experienced as ‘loss of self’ –
for example as might accompany the onset of debilitat-
ing illness – and represent a significant identity-related
harm. However, a narrative interpretation suggests that
this harm does not attach to the sheer fact of disruption.
Rather it obtains when disruption renders us unable to
recognise ourselves, make sense of who we are, or find
meaning in our lives, and to lose the interpretive frame-
work and foundations from which we navigate and
engage with the world [57].
Construing the ethical significance of information’s
effects on identity solely in terms of self-estrangement,
may also lead us to miss other consequences that war-
rant attention. For example, a third participant in the
study reported that the device gave them “more confi-
dence”, made them feel “more in control”, reduced their
reliance on their relatives, and allowed them to “push
on” to do what they “wanted to do” [38, 78]. The
authors do not class this as a change in sense of self
(indeed the participant themselves asserts that they had
not changed “as a person”) [38 p.5]. However, without
seeking to second-guess this testimony, within it we
might recognise precisely these feelings of increased
self-efficacy as non-trivial developments in someone’s
story of who they are, while a reduced reliance on
relatives reconfigures both the relational plotlines of
their narrative and, possibly, the respective contribu-
tions of its co-authors.
Finally, integral to the idea of estrangement is the
idea that the identity change is involuntary [80]. And the
authors’ analysis conducted in these terms implies that
the participants are passive with respect to the identity
effects of the predictive information generated by their
devices. While it is true that users cannot control when
warning signals are generated, it seems not unreason-
able to suppose that – unlike, for example, direct neural
effects of DBS25 – some users can exercise agency in
deciding how to interpret and use the information (or
not) in constructing their accounts of who they are. This
24 Françoise Baylis makes a similar point with respect to effects on
identity of personality changes accompanying treatment using deep-
brain stimulation, though the extent and nature of change that Baylis
regards as ethically innocuous is wider than that proposed here [39].
25 DBS is another context in which the authors have discussed the
ethical ramifications of self-estrangement, in that context, precipitated
by behavioural and personality changes that occur following direct
electronic stimulation of neurones by implanted electrodes [see, for
example 80].
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much is indicated by several participants in the study,
one of who reports that they “just ignore[d]” the alerts,
while another appears to enjoy the quotidian ubiquity of
their device [38, p.5]. This not true of all participants.
For example, one participant describes how the “con-
stant beeping” made her feel like she “had no control”
[38, p.7].26 These findings, viewed through the lens of
narrativity, offer a valuable reminder that in some cases
information from neurotechnologies may be experi-
enced as an uncontrollable ‘impact’ on our identities,
but in others it can offer a tool, facilitating our agency in
our identity development. The example discussed next
will highlight some further ways in which analysis of
identity impacts of neuro-information through the lens
of narrativity that may bring out the wider nature and
ethical significance of these impacts.
Psychiatric Neuroimaging
Several empirical studies have explored patients’ (actual
or anticipated) reactions to receiving predictive or diag-
nostic information based on neuroimaging findings that
purport to provide information about the structural or
functional neural correlates of serious psychiatric con-
ditions such as depression or schizophrenia [35–37,
82–84]. These findings include attitudes that may be
read as indicating roles for this kind of information in
patients’ identity narratives. For example, some partici-
pants in these studies report that they do (or would)
welcome information about neural correlates of their
symptoms as “proof” of the objective reality of their
illness [36, 82]. They may view it, for example, as
validating their suffering, allaying others’ scepticism
[82], or demonstrating that they are not “just crazy”
[36 p.74]. Other respondents anticipate that it might
allow patients to reframe their illness as just another
physical disease, thus reducing stigma and self-blame,
motivating uptake of therapies [83, 84], or facilitating a
separation between self and disorder. Clinicians
interviewed in one study, however, anticipated more
negative reactions, fearing that patients would view the
implicit authority and objectivity of neuroimaging data
as indications that the disease is more intractable, or lead
to pessimistic identification with their apparently disor-
dered brains [35].
These findings lend plausibility and texture to my
core contention – that information generated by
neurotechnologies may play roles in our self-
conceptions that warrant ethical attention. Several of
these studies use the language of identity to analyse
some of their participants’ responses to neuroimaging
information [35, 36]. However, they draw upon a rela-
tively narrow conception of identity impacts and asso-
ciated normative palette. For example, identity changes
tend to be framed in terms of the role information may
play in bolstering specific modes of (biologised) self-
description, such as ‘being depressed’ or someone with
defective brain chemistry [36, 37]. Identity benefits are,
accordingly, seen in terms of reducing stigma.
Meanwhile, identity harms are interpreted in terms of
potentially stigmatising or demotivating effects of
adopting a neuroreductive view of the self, for example
as someone with “error in them” [35, p.6]. These anal-
yses provide valuable insights. However, the identity-
significance of other reported impacts – for example,
those of explaining or publicly validating illness expe-
riences, reducing self-blame, or making therapeutic
choices – tend not to be interpreted or labelled as such.
From the perspective of a narrative conception, we
might interpret these reactions as indications of some
of the ways that results from psychiatric neuroimaging
may shape individuals’ identities – for better or
worse – in a wider range of ways, for example by
providing new evaluative lenses though which to
interpret their experiences and their relationship to
their illness, or by shifting how other people’s
attitudes impact on their self-conceptions. The ac-
count I have proposed makes space for recognising
identity impacts beyond the adoption or loss of
labels. It also offers a means of articulating why
both new labels and fresh explanations may en-
gage not only clinical interests, but significant
identity-related ones – beyond stigma – to the
extent that they enhance or undermine individuals’
capacities to make sense of their experiences of
psychiatric illness as part of their accounts of who
they are, and inhabit these accounts as the vessels
in which they navigate their own and others’ re-
sponses to illness.
These findings also offer (albeit indirectly) a means
of appreciating the ways in which the positive and
negative roles that neuro-information may play in our
26 This example further highlights (see n1 above) how it may not
always be possible to separate the users’ experiences of, and the
identity impacts, of their interaction with the device itself and their
encounters with the information generated by the device. This also
underscores what I say below about the importance of attending to the
manner in information is communicated.
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identity narratives are contingent not only upon the
circumstances of individual recipients, but also upon
the reliability and accuracy of the predictions, diagnoses
or explanations that the information can provide. There
are enduring questions about the (current) capacities of
functional neuroimaging to provide reliable diagnostic
or predictive information in clinical psychiatric contexts
[85–87]. These doubts stem not only from maturity of
the technology, but also from more fundamental con-
cerns about the irreducibility of the mind (and its health)
to the brain and the extent to which existing diagnostic
categories are not coextensive with neurological differ-
ences. If a psychiatric patient were to use misleading or
meaningless imaging findings in the construction of
their identity, without being aware of its epistemic lim-
itations, the concern is that this may not only have
clinical implications – for example misdirecting treat-
ment choices – but that it may undermine the coherence
and inhabitability of their identity. For example, misdi-
agnosis may ill-prepare someone to anticipate, make
sense of or manage the particular experiences of living
with a particular disorder, while overreliance on neuro-
logical explanations may engender unwarranted fatal-
ism, or lead someone to undervalue environmental or
social contributions to their mental health. Even if these
outcomes do not inevitably or immediately render
someone’s identity incoherent, my suggestion is
that they may contribute to a distorted frame
through which the individual interprets their past,
navigates the present and plans their future narra-
tive, and renders this narrative vulnerable to chal-
lenge by future illness experiences.
Empirical studies such as those discussed above are
crucial in illustrating and enhancing our understanding
of the potential identity impacts of neuro-information.
The findings cited indicate how information from two
particular applications of neurotechnologies can affect
users’ identities and do so in diverse ways depending on
their circumstances and experiences of living with epi-
lepsy or psychiatric illness. The narrative account I have
presented in the preceding sections offers valuable ad-
ditional means of interpreting and drawing out the
nature and significance of these effects qua iden-
tity impacts (as opposed to solely effects on health
or emotional wellbeing) and why identity changes
may (or may not) engage important interests. It
also provides some indications as to how these
interests might be appropriately protected and pro-
moted in practice.
Practical Implications for Information Disclosure
Building on the argument and illustrative examples
above, I now turn to propose some high-level indica-
tions of the ways in which I believe the claims made
above should make concrete differences to ethical
decision-making and practices governing whether and
how we – as users and information subjects – access
information about our brains and minds generated by
neurotechnologies.
The central recommendation to be drawn fromwhat I
have argued is that possible impacts of information
generated by neurotechnologies on users’ interests in
developing coherent, intelligible and inhabitable identi-
ties must be included as part of ethical decisions about
making this information available to them. These im-
pacts need to be weighed alongside those on other more
routinely considered interests – such as, health, avoid-
ance of distress, autonomy, privacy and freedom from
discrimination – when considering ethical implications
about whether and how to convey this information.
According to the characterisation of identity interests
offered here, the roles that information about our brains
and minds may play in meeting these are equivalent
neither to mere curiosity, nor a contemporary desire to
track and quantify, nor yet to relatively bounded inter-
ests in the acquisition or loss of particular discrete self-
descriptors. Rather they are rooted deep in our capacities
for self-understanding and for navigating and engaging
with our embodied states, the world and other people. A
such, these interests are far from trivial, they go to the
very heart of our existences as embodied persons.
While, they may intersect with aspects of the other more
commonly considered interests listed above, they are
not coextensive with or reducible to these. For example,
I have suggested the coherence and inhabitability of our
self-narratives matters in part because it provides the
foundations for our capacity for autonomy – where
autonomy requires critical, reflective evaluation and
reconciliation of our motives and choices in light of
our wider values and goals, developed and exercised
in relational and embodied contexts [88, 89]. However,
not only is autonomy just one aspect of the valuable
practical capacities supported by our self-narratives, but
attending to information’s effects on the coherence and
inhabitability of our identity-narratives may demand a
different set of considerations than attending autonomy
alone does, when it comes to deciding what information
to disclose or how to do so (depending on the
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conception of autonomy interests in operation).27
Similarly, finding oneself unable to make sense of
who one is may very well be distressing but, as just
indicated, it has wider implications that that contempo-
raneous experiences of distress. Meanwhile the path to a
more coherent identity that better serves us in navigating
our lives may not itself be without emotional burdens.
Whether to Disclose
Questions about identity-sensitive disclosure practices
are then in part questions about whether the information
generated by neurotechnologies should be offered or
communicated to those to whom it pertains.
Importantly, according to the characterisation of identity
interests offered here, this means recognising the
potentially substantial identity benefits of informa-
tion from neurotechnologies, while not ignoring
the possibility of threats to identity. This is a
significant departure from presumptions that our identi-
ties are either impervious to fresh information, or else
vulnerable to being broken by it.
In some cases, information communication will be
integral to the function of the neurotechnology in ques-
tion – as in the case of the implanted predictive BCIs of
the first example above. However, in other contexts,
disclosure may not be standard practice and will require
justification on grounds of recipients’ interests in know-
ing. For example, much ethical guidance on policies for
returning individually-relevant research findings to par-
ticipants prioritise the return of clinically significant and
actionable findings [20].28 One might imagine research
findings indicating evidence of several ‘silent strokes’ or
unusual neural activity, generated as part of neuroimag-
ing studies or BCI development that do not meet these
criteria, but nevertheless exhibit potential identity
significance, such as offering possible explanations for
experiences of cognitive decline or mood changes,
which could make valuable contributions to the partic-
ipants’ self-narrative. Identity-significance alone may
not be the only relevant factor in reaching disclosure
decisions in such circumstances, but the claims made
above illustrate why it should be weighed as an impor-
tant consideration amongst others.
One key consideration in any decision about disclo-
sure will be the quality of the information generated. I
have suggested that misleading or unreliable informa-
tion about our brains or minds is likely to run counter to
our interests in constructing coherent, resilient identities.
Attending to these interests adds a further layer to
existing health-related concerns about providing
poorly-evidenced and unreliable information to patients,
participants, or consumers as expressed, for example, in
relation to the risks of accurate health information and
advice generated by consumer neurotechnologies [16,
19]. It also provides a countervailing position to one
particular kind of argument – based on a somewhat thin
conception of autonomy – that, where health-related
risks are not serious or inevitable, individuals should
be free to access information of questionable epistemic
value from consumer technologies if doing so is enjoy-
able, serves their curiosity, or simply their choice.29 It is
by no means obvious that these kinds of ‘personal
utility’ engage more critical interests than concern for
our abilities to develop coherent, inhabitable and resil-
ient identities. I would, therefore, suggest that potential
for identity harms may provide additional persuasive
grounds for seeking to control the marketing of
neurotechnologies or services that provide unreliable
or erroneous information (or at least doing so without
explicit explanation of these limitations). It also adds
weight to the importance of ensuring the suitability of
the algorithms and training data used in cognitive and
mental wellbeing wearables and mobile apps to ensure
that they provide accurate data and advice to all users
[93, 94].
How to Disclose
Thus far I have focused on what recognition of identity
interests implies for decisions about whether to share or
27 For example, because of the risks of rendering someone’s self-
narrative unrecognisable, incoherent or uninhabitable, consideration
of identity interests is likely to recommend a more limited range of
information disclosure than approaches that equate autonomy interests
with either ‘whatever the individual wants to know’ or with the idea
that as long as information is reliable it can only benefit our capacities
for autonomy by equipping us with additional material on which to
reflect and base our decisions [90, 91]. Meanwhile, considerations of
identity may recommend wider grounds for disclosing neuro-
information than those which equate autonomy interests with informa-
tional control or protection against unsought information, as it recog-
nises the potential identity value of as-yet unknown information [92].
28 The phrase ‘individually relevant’ is used to distinguish findings that
are about the circumstances of a particular participant from aggregated
research results.
29 This kind of argument has been advanced most notably in relation to
access to direct-to-consumer genomic testing where the clinical valid-
ity and utility of some tests are questionable [91].
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disclose information. But no less important is a focus on
how information is conveyed. By this I mean to capture
the explanatory and interpretive context in which it is
communicated and the support that is offered to the
recipient in understanding what it means (and, just as
importantly, does not mean) for her own neurological,
mental and cognitive health and wellbeing. There are a
number of reasons why the context and manner of
disclosure is so important.
One is the role of information quality in its potential
identity impacts, as just discussed. It is possible that
some of the risks of building misapprehensions into
one’s self-narrative may be averted if recipients are
made aware of its epistemic limitations.30 A second
reason is that, as is apparent in the two illustrative
examples offered above, whether a recipient experi-
ences neuro-information as valuable or detrimental to
their identity is idiosyncratic. It may not be possible to
predict how any particular recipient will react. The way
in which it is offered and conveyed could provide a
critical opportunity to anticipate and manage negative
reactions. Underlying each of these reasons is a more
fundamental one. Identity development is in itself an
essentially interpretive and relational undertaking. We
often rely on others when finding meaning and signifi-
cance in the myriad experiences and details of our lives
and when determining what to use, include or reject
from our accounts of who we are. The need for this
support where neuro-information is concerned may be
even more pressing than with more quotidian experi-
ences given its novelty, technical complexities and pos-
sible sensitivities.31
If interpretive support is indeed central to promoting
and protecting our identity interests, this has particular
implications for implants and wearables that deliver
information about neurological and mental health and
wellbeing directly, without the intercession of a person
and in a semantically minimal way, for example, simply
as an alert, or in a quantified or graphical form.We need
to consider very carefully the consequences of providing
potentially identity-significant neuro-information
through device interfaces that offer little or no opportu-
nity for integrated or concurrent contextual information
and interpretive support. In some cases, such as the
predictive BCI described above, the immediacy of an
unadorned alert serves an important unmet clinical need.
Even in these cases, however, there is an accompanying
need to manage users’ expectations and understanding
of the information they will receive and provide appro-
priate sign-posting to further supplementary information
and support. This may be more readily achieved in care
and research settings than with consumer products.
Gilbert and co-authors recommend that, before inclu-
sion in experimental trials of predictive BCIs, potential
participants should undergo psychometric assessment of
links between their self-image and epilepsy and suscep-
tibility to identity-related harm, thus their suitability for
inclusion in trials or particular needs for preparatory
support [38].32 In light of what a narrative conception
suggests about the idiosyncratic ways that neuro-
information may affect our identities (for better or
worse), not least because our existing self-narratives
are likely to shape how we respond to and use fresh
information, this is an interesting and pertinent recom-
mendation. People will vary to the extent to which they
and their self-narratives are vulnerable or resilient the
impacts of this information. However, care should be
exercised when it comes to designating any particular
groups as inherently more or less susceptible to identity
harm. Vulnerabilities to such harms may have multiple
sources and be dependent on contextual factors beyond
the individual [96]. Moreover, while the possibility of
serious identity harm means that such pre-operative
assessments may indeed be a sensible precautionary
measure, I would repeat here the need for caution about
conceiving of identity change, even abrupt and marked
change, as necessarily something about which we
should be concerned or seek to avert. All of our identi-
ties are in a state of perpetual evolution and reconfigu-
ration. I have sought to highlight in this discussion that
encounters with information about our brains and our
minds may serve to reshape anyone’s account of who
they are, and in ways that are not necessarily
30 For example, studies conducted with research participants undergo-
ing genetic testing for variants associated with increased risk of devel-
oping late onset Alzhemer’s disease indicate that genetic counselling
about the limited predictive power of the findings mitigated (though
did not wholly obviate) some of the ways that participants viewed the
findings and used them to reflect upon their lives, relationship and
priorities [95].
31 It seems likely that information recipients’ appreciation of the epi-
stemic limitations of the information is not only shaped at the ‘point of
use’ or disclosure, but, as noted above, also by wider cultural discus-
sions about the nature and value of information generated by
neurotechnologies.
32 The authors clarify that exclusion from early experimental trials on
grounds of identity risks would not deny participants access to proven
therapeutic interventions.
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detrimental. And any of us may need support in making
s ens e o f i n f o rma t i on p r e s en t ed t o u s by
neurotechnologies, whether this entails incorporating it
or rejecting it from our understandings of who we are. If
the coherence and inhabitability of our self-narratives
are indeed disrupted by the advent of new information,
what matters is that we have access to any available
interpretive tools to reconstruct a sense of who we are
that serves us in continuing to make sense of and nav-
igate our embodied, thinking, feeling and perceiving
lives.
Conclusion
If identity impacts are to feature as serious consider-
ations in bioethical debates about how to manage infor-
mation generated by neurotechnologies – as I have
argued they must be – and if users’ interests in their
own encounters with this information are to be appro-
priately protected, then it is not enough for these debates
to allude in broad terms to possible identity effects’ (or
even ‘narrative identity effects’) of these encounters.We
need to understand what these effects look like and why
they warrant ethical attention. Empirical studies of the
kinds cited above will be part of filling in this picture,
but they cannot achieve it without a clear conceptual and
normative framework, which characterises the nature of
our interests in developing and inhabiting our identities
and the roles of information in this, through which to
interpret their findings.
Here I have addressed these gaps by proposing a
normative account of the role of information about our
brains and minds in narrative self-constitution. I have
argued that these kinds of information can help us to
construct identity-constituting narratives that make sense
of our experiences and support us in navigating our lives.
It does so not only by providing characteristics and
plotlines for these narratives, but also by offering valu-
able explanatory and interpretive context for our embod-
ied experiences – experiences of ill health, shifting
moods, and changing cognitive and physical capacities.
Not all information generated by neurotechnologies will
fulfil these roles equally well, or in the same ways for
everyone. However, to the extent that that it does, it offers
a vital tool in the construction of coherent and inhabitable
identity-constituting narratives.
The context-dependent and often idiosyncratic ways
in which information about our brains and minds
generated by neurotechnologies impacts upon our self-
narratives means that governing this information so as to
protect our identity-related interests may not be a
straightforward matter. But this alone is not reason to
ignore them. I have argued that, because our identity-
constituting narratives provide the foundations for our
self-understanding, values and practical engagement
with the world, we have critical interests developing
coherent and inhabitable self-narratives, and thus in
the epistemic tools for doing so. This includes informa-
tion about our brains and minds. For these reasons, I
have argued, that decisions and practices governing
whether and, crucially, how we have access to informa-
tion generated by neurotechnologies must take into ac-
count the extent to which this supports or undermines
these interests. And where information generated by
neurotechnologies engages these interests, they warrant
comparable attention alongside more commonly consid-
ered information-related concerns such as impacts on
health and autonomy, and risks to privacy.
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